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THE INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
GOVERNING CORPORATE DEBT
RELATIONSHIPS
William W. Bratton, Jr. *
INTRODUCTION
There is a generally accepted picture of corporate debt relation-
ships under which the entire responsibility for governance falls to the
contract drafter. Contracts governing corporate debt instruments-
trust indentures in the case of bonds and debentures, and loan agree-
ments in the case of privately placed notes and long-term bank
loans-are generally viewed as the only meaningful source of rights
and duties in corporate debtor-creditor relationships.' State business
corporation laws provide no alternative, as their creditor protection
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University;
A.B., 1973, J.D., 1976, Columbia University. My colleague, David Carlson, provided his usual
able assistance. Thanks also are extended to John D. Niles, for teaching me the drafting basics.
[A] fundamental characteristic of long-term debt financing is that the rights of the
holders of the debt securities are largely a matter of contract. There is no governing
body of statutory or common law that protects the holder of unsecured debt secur-
ities against harmful acts by the debtor except in the most extreme situations. Short
of bankruptcy, the debt securityholder can do nothing to protect himself against
actions of the borrower which jeopardize its ability to pay the debt unless he takes a
mortgage or other collateral or establishes his rights through contractual provisions
set forth in the debt agreement or indenture.
American Bar Foundation Corporate Debt Financing Project, Commentaries on Indentures 2
(1971) [hereinafter cited as ABF Commentaries], quoted in Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642
F.2d 929, 940 n.10 (5th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
It should be noted that a different picture obtains if a corporate debtor becomes insolvent.
At that point, the law of fraudulent conveyances restricts corporate management's discretion to
do business for the stockholders' benefit and imposes duties to creditors. See, e.g., Unif. Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act §§ 4, 6, 7A U.L.A. 205, 240 (1978).
While this Article discusses "debt contracts" that govern secured and unsecured borrowings,
it does not discuss the law of security interests and mortgages or the interpretation of security
agreements or mortgage documents.
A "trust indenture" is a contract entered into between a corporation issuing bonds or
debentures and a trustee for the holders of the bonds or debentures. It delineates the rights of the
holders and the issuer. Corporate practice distinguishes "bonds" from "debentures." "Bonds" are
secured long-term notes issued pursuant to a trust indenture. "Debentures" are unsecured long-
term notes issued pursuant to a trust indenture. See ABF Commentaries, supra, at 7 n.3. A "loan
agreement" is a contract entered into between a corporation issuing long-term notes and the
purchasers of the notes. Like a trust indenture, it delineates the rights of the holders and the
issuer. See id. at 4-14.
Loan agreements involve the issuer and the holders in a direct contractual relationship.
They tend therefore to govern transactions, like bank loans and insurance company private
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provisions are notoriously ineffective.2 Nor, traditionally, have judi-
cially imposed duties entered into the governance of these relation-
ships.
3
Complicated contract forms fill this governance vacuum. These
forms have been worked and reworked by successive generations of
lawyers to deal with the remotest of contingencies relating to the
future course of the transaction and the borrower's business. The very
thoroughness of these contracts limits the role of courts in adjudicating
controversies between corporate borrowers and long-term lenders. In
the generally accepted picture, the judge ascertains and enforces the
drafter's directions-a matter of "interpretation" rather than "law-
making"-without further involvement in the transaction. So con-
ceived, debt contract interpretation is a highly technical but cut-and-
dried exercise, lacking the ethical element presented by governance
disputes between corporations and common stockholders.
This Article tests the accuracy of the generally accepted picture
against the evidence contained in some recent debt contract interpre-
tation cases. The cases support a recomposition of the picture, with
the interpreting judge put in the more prominent position of second-
ary lawmaker. But the picture emerging from the cases lacks focus:
The courts vacillate in familiar ways, sometimes inclining to respect
the drafter's primacy and the authority of words, and other times
inclining to intervene in the relationship to effect a fair result. Indeed,
the struggle for primacy between the exacting view of contract inter-
pretation of Williston and the first Restatement of Contracts4 (herein
denoted "classical") and the more relaxed view of Corbin and the
placements, involving small numbers of lenders. Trust indentures, by contrast, facilitate the
borrowing of small amounts of money on a long-term basis from larger numbers of lenders on
identical terms by channelling administration and enforcement through a single party, the
indenture trustee. See V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, Corporate Finance 82 (2d ed. 1979).
Accordingly, trust indentures govern publicly issued bonds and debentures. Model forms of both
types of contract are readily available. For trust indentures, see ABF Commentaries, supra;
Committee on Developments in Business Financing of the Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law of the American Bar Association, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus. Law. 741
(1983). For loan agreements, see Nassberg, Loan Documentation: Basic But Crucial, 36 Bus.
Law. 843 (1981); Simmons, Drafting of Commercial Bank Loan Agreements, 28 Bus. Law. 179
(1972); Simpson, The Drafting of Loan Agreements: A Borrower's Viewpoint, 28 Bus. Law.
1161 (1973).
1 See generally B. Manning, A Concise Textbook on Legal Capital 84-90 (2d ed. 1981)
("statutory legal capital machinery provides little or no significant protection to creditors of
corporations").
Cf. ABF Commentaries, supra note 1, at 2-3 ("There is no governing body of statutory or
common law that protects the holder of unsecured debt securities .... .
Restatement of Contracts (1932).
372 [Vol. 5:371
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts5 (herein denoted "neoclassical") 6
continues in the debt contract context.
7
This Article concludes that courts should stop vacillating and
take a fully neoclassical approach to debt contract interpretation. The
analysis that follows shows that the arrogation of judicial governance
authority entailed thereby will not impair corporate debtor-creditor
relationships.
I. STANDARD PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
The first part of this Article recounts some basic principles of
contract interpretation, both classical and neoclassical, and demon-
strates that several of these must be modified if they are to meet the
special requirements of the debt contract context.
A. Standards of Interpretation
Contract interpretation is the process by which courts ascertain
the meaning of unclear contract language.8 Contract law provides
norms to guide the process.
In their classical formulation, these norms direct the court to
adhere to the text and look to standard English usage to supply
meaning.9 They envision an "objective" judicial inquiry: A correct
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981).
6 The terms "classical" and "neoclassical" are Professor Macneil's. See Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 854 (1978).
' The struggle continues in other contexts as well. Compare Interform Co. v. Mitchell, 575
F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1978) (neoclassical approach to interpretation of sales contract) with
Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1967) (classical approach to interpreta-
tion of sales contract).
The conflict between classical and neoclassical approaches to interpretation tends to be
conceived historically: Time marches on from the early modern era of Williston to the complete
modernity of Corbin; classicism is past and neoclassicism is present. This historical picture
oversimplifies matters considerably, however. Interpretive classicism is fully discredited only in
neoclassical commentary. Classical approaches (if not the full classical program) live on in the
same reporters and sometimes the same opinions as their neoclassical counterparts. This Article
examines the ramifications of this tense coexistence in respect of judicial interpretation of debt
contracts.
8 See E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.7, at 477 (1982). This Article follows the distinction
between vagueness and ambiguity noted in W. Quine, Word and Object 85 (1960), and
amplified by Professor Farnsworth, supra, § 7.8, at 479-80. Under this distinction, words are
vague to the extent they define a "distribution about a central norm" rather than a "neatly
bounded class." Ambiguity occurs when a term or phrase is susceptible to two or more discrete
readings. "Unclear" language can be either "vague" or "ambiguous." Id.
9 For a classic classical opinion, see Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F.
976, 984-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (L. Hand, J.). Classical standards of interpretation are well
explained in Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939, 946-47 (1967).
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meaning exists and can be discovered through proper analysis. That
meaning attaches whether or not intended by the parties. Contracting
parties, it is thought, should be forced to express themselves in clear
standard English.
Neoclassical norms, in contrast, direct the court to protect the
particular parties' expectations. They abandon classical "objectivity"
in favor of responsiveness to the particular transactional context. The
parties' "subjective" understanding of the contract's meaning becomes
a relevant-even critical-contextual element.
Of course, opposing parties only rarely appear in court confirm-
ing a commonly held subjective meaning and leaving the judge with
the ministerial job of attaching their meaning to the contract lan-
guage. More commonly, the judge must take a more active role in
shaping the relationship. For example, if two parties have conflicting
understandings, the judge must choose between them. A similar
choice must be made where one party has a subjective understanding
of a provision's meaning and the other party, having neither read nor
thought about the provision, has no subjective understanding at all.
The neoclassical Restatement (Second) includes norms for the resolu-
tion of such cases. Where subjective understandings conflict with one
another or with standard usage, the Restatement (Second) finds fault
with the party with "knowledge" or "reason to know" of the other
party's understanding. The party with "reason to know" loses.' 0 This
approach protects the less well-informed party while encouraging the
better informed party to make disclosures regarding the contract's
legal effect.
In a case where neither party has a subjective understanding of a
provision's meaning, the neoclassical judge may play an even more
prominent role in the relationship. If the provision is very unclear, the
judge acts as drafter of last resort and, looking to the context, formu-
lates the necessary term."
'10 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 20, 201(2), 220 (1981); see also Speidel, Restate-
ment Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 785, 793-96 (1982)
(describing the "reason to know" test in the Restatement (Second)).
Note that the party with "reason to know" is at fault both in the sense of being culpable and
in the sense of having caused the loss. Note also the efficiency judgment implicit in the ap-
proach-the better-informed party more cheaply can prevent the interpretation problem ever
from arising by proposing better-drafted contract language. Cf. Phillips, The Commercial
Culpability Scale, 92 Yale L.J. 228, 251-61 (1982) (discussing the moral and instrumentalist
functions of culpability based rules in commercial law).
" But see the recent debt contract opinion, Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels
Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), in which the following reason is given for
rejection of an interpretation: "[lilt appears keyed to the subjective expectations of the bondhold-
ers .... The approach ... reads a subjective element into what presumably should be an
[Vol. 5:371
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To apply "subjective" neoclassical interpretation principles to
debt contracts successfully, one must be sensitive to several contextual
peculiarities. Consider first one species of debt contract, the trust
indenture governing publicly-traded bonds or debentures. Trust in-
dentures contain mostly standardized provisions. With the assistance
of the American Bar Foundation's readily available Model Inden-
ture, 1 2 considerable uniformity has been achieved among the standard
provisions contained in trust indentures governing different issues of
bonds and debentures on the market. Standardization benefits the
market by making the valuation process simpler and less costly. In
valuing an issue, the prospective investor may assume the presence of
standard terms and focus exclusively on business points such as the
soundness of the issuer, the interest rate, redemption rights and the
like. 13
Now consider how the trust indenture's marketplace function
bears on the judicial interpretation process. If a material variance
were to open up between the standard form's legal meaning and
investors' assumptions concerning its meaning, market prices no
longer would reflect the value of bonds and debentures accurately. 14 A
objective determination based on the language appearing in the bond agreement." Id. at 1535-
36. There follows immediately a second, subjective reason for rejecting the same interpreta-
tion-the "uncertainty among bondholders" that the reading would prompt. Id. at 1536. This
reasoning is incoherent. Bondholder "uncertainty" and bondholder "subjective expectations" are
the same thing; to prevent uncertainty is to protect expectations.
'2 The Model Indenture is incorporated in the ABF Commentaries, supra note 1. For further
discussion of the market function of the Model Indenture, see Bratton, The Economies and
Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
A large degree of uniformity in the language of debenture indentures is essential to
the effective functioning of the financial markets; uniformity of the indentures that
govern competing debenture issues is what makes it possible meaningfully to com-
pare one debenture issue with another, focusing only on the business provisions of
the issue (such as the interest rate, the maturity date, the redemption and sinking
fund provisions and the conversion rate) and the economic conditions of the issuer,
without being misled by peculiarities in the underlying instruments.
Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
(1981).
14 Whereas participants in the capital market can adjust their affairs according to a
uniform interpretation, whether it be correct or not as an initial proposition, the
creation of enduring uncertainties as to the meaning of boilerplate provisions would
decrease the value of all debenture issues and greatly impair the efficient working of
capital markets. Such uncertainties would vastly increase the risks and, therefore,
the costs of borrowing with no offsetting benefits either in the capital market or in
the administration of justice. Just such uncertainties would be created if interpreta-
tion of boilerplate provisions were submitted to juries sitting in every judicial district
in the nation.
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1253 (1983). The notion that neoclassical inquiry "would vastly increase. ..
the costs of borrowing" is discussed critically infra at notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
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court could create such a variance by interpreting a trust indenture in
a way contrary to its generally accepted marketplace meaning. Since
judicial interpretation of one such standard form contract affects the
meaning and effect of hundreds of other such contracts, an aberrant
interpretation could create market-wide uncertainty. Such uncer-
tainty would increase the costs of valuing existing issues and drafting
the language of future issues. If an aberrant interpretation gained
general judicial currency, rights respecting all outstanding issues
would be altered and market-wide wealth transfers between bond-
holders and stockholders would result.
Thus, we find that the contract law "expectations" of holders of
publicly-traded debt securities and the assumptions underlying the
market pricing process amount to the same thing. For the neoclassical
interpretation process to protect these expections, the marketplace's
understanding of trust indenture terms must prevail over conflicting
judicial concepts in the rare case where the marketplace's understand-
ing conflicts with the meaning dictated by standard English usage.
Whether marketplace understanding should also prevail over
conflicting understandings of particular issuers or trustees presents a
more difficult question. 15 The bondholders probably still have the best
of the argument. Consider the following hypothetical case: A bond
issuer and the indenture trustee secretly agree as to their "subjective"
understanding of the meaning of standard trust indenture language
while on notice of facts suggesting that bondholders in the market-
place do not share their understanding. Note that here, the "intent of
the parties" corresponds to the secret meaning. A trust indenture is
entered into between the issuer and the trustee for the benefit of the
bond or debenture holders; strictly speaking, the holders are not
"parties" to the contract. In this hypothetical, then, an interpretation
that follows the "intent of the parties" would frustrate the bondhold-
ers' conflicting expectations and penalize them for relying on publicly
available information and the market pricing process. 16 But such
11 This issue almost arose in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Carolina Power & Light
Co., 717 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1983). The case, further discussed infra note 68, concerned the
meaning of the redemption provisions in the supplemental indenture governing an issue of
privately placed utility bonds. Each side presented conflicting evidence of "industry understand-
ing." 717 F.2d at 668, 670.
16 Even so, courts routinely state that the "intent of the parties" is their guide in interpreting
trust indentures. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929,947 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). But see Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982) (particularized intentions of parties to standard form trust
indentures found irrelevant), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1253 (1983); Broad, 614 F.2d 418, 429 (5th
Cir. 1980) (panel opinion in the same case as above).
[Vol. 5:371
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results can be avoided by invoking the "reason to know" test against
the issuer, as it has "reason to know" of the different understanding
prevailing on the marketplace.
The hypothetical becomes much more difficult if the issuer for-
mulates its understanding without collusion, secrecy, or notice of tell-
tale facts indicating a contrary understanding in the marketplace. Yet
so long as "reason to know" is a concept sufficiently elastic to encom-
pass determinations that one party "should know" the meaning at-
tached by the other party,17 then it provides a means of protecting
marketplace expectations even here. The issuer arguably "should
know" because it has an informational advantage. It can more effi-
ciently ascertain the market's understanding (by questioning its invest-
ment bankers or taking a survey) than marketplace investors can
ascertain the subjective understandings of different bond issuers (by
means of separate interrogations). The issuer's fault ripens when it
places the bonds in the stream of commerce without disclosing its
subjective understanding.
We have seen that the most basic of rubrics-intrepretation in
accordance with the intention of the parties-cannot be applied liter-
ally in the interpretation of trust indentures. But hornbook standards
of interpretation may be applied without apparent need for adjust-
ment in the context of the other major species of debt contract,
agreements governing bank loans and private placements. In those
arrangements, borrowers and lenders contract directly; extensive
face-to-face negotiations are likely to occur.18 Since the parties to the
contract are the parties interested in the contract, interpreting in
accord with the "intent of the parties" presents no problem. Even so,
marketplace understanding remains a potentially decisive, albeit sec-
ondary, source of meaning. Private loan agreements contain "boiler-
plate" provisions as well as heavily negotiated provisions. Such boiler-
plate may track or closely resemble the language of standard trust
17 The Restatement (Second) concept of "reason to know" seems to encompass "should
know," although its explanatory comment is far from clear. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
19 comment b (1981); see also id. § 220(2) (interpretation in accord with outside usage prevails
over the subjective understanding of a party having reason to know of that usage).
18 The practice in insurance company private placements has each lender enter into a
separate note agreement with the issuer. But negotiations may be carried on between the
borrower and a "lead" lender acting informally on behalf of other institutions in the group of
lenders. Bank arrangements also feature larger institutions acting as leads. The relations between
the participating banks, however, tend to be formalized in participation agreements. In "true"
participations, only the lead bank contracts with the borrower. It thereafter sells participations
in its loans to other banks under the participation agreement. "Agented" participations make the
lead bank the agent of the others in dealing with the borrower and may vest more or less control
of the administration of the loan in the lead. See Nassberg, supra note 1, at 859-60.
1984]
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indentures. The particular parties very well may have no subjective
understanding of the meaning of such provisions. Absent subjective
understanding, the understanding prevailing in the relevant market-
place-here, the community of investment bankers, institutional in-
vestors and other leading institutions- would be the meaning most
likely to protect justified expectations. 19 The special place held by
trade usage in the interpretation of commercial contracts provides a
persuasive analogy.
20
B. The "Reasonableness" Rubric
The standards of interpretation discussed above are more signifi-
cant in theory than in practice. Litigated questions of debt contract
interpretation tend to concern either unnoticed drafting defects or
unforeseen situations. Such cases result from failures of perception
and prediction by those involved in the contractual relationship. As a
result, no one interested in the relationship has an articulable under-
standing of the contract's meaning to put before the court. Accord-
ingly, courts often have to interpret debt contracts (and many others
as well) without the aid of clarifying evidence of the parties' subjective
understanding or of outside usages. In such cases, the neoclassical
interpreter, like his classical counterpart, falls back on the rubric
"reasonableness. "21
Reasonable interpretation rests on what courts and lawyers as-
sume to be the linguistic usages and other patterns of mind of ordinar-
ily reasonable persons. Courts and lawyers employ these assumptions
as interpretive rules.22 The Restatement (Second) contains the familiar
catalogue. It assumes that reasonable persons employ standard En-
glish usage. It thus includes the rule that language be interpreted in
accord with its "generally prevailing meaning." 23 It assumes that
19 An entirely different line of reasoning may be offered to support the argument that the
marketplace's prevailing understanding ought to be imposed.
[One] economic function [of the law of contracts] . . . is to reduce the complexity
and hence [the] cost of transactions by supplying a set of normal terms that, in the
absence of a law of contracts, the parties would have to negotiate expressly. This
function of the law is similar to that performed by a standard or form contract.
R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 69 (2d ed. 1977). Thus, by choosing the interpretation that
most parties would choose, and allowing the minority to negotiate out of such an interpretation,
courts are likely to reduce the cost of negotiation-or so the theory goes.
'0 See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-208 (1978). The generalized concept of a "usage" as any "habitual
or customary practice" found in the Restatement (Second) could be applied to marketplace
understanding of debt contract meaning. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 219, 220 (1981).
2 See E. Farnsworth, supra note 8, § 7.9, at 491.
22 Id. § 7.11, at 495.
23 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(3)(a) (1981).
[Vol. 5:371
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reasonable persons draft internally consistent documents. It thus in-
cludes the rules that writings in a single transaction be interpreted
together, and that an interpretation giving effective meaning to all
terms of an agreement prevail over an interpretation leaving a part
with an unreasonable or ineffective meaning.24 It assumes that even
reasonable persons fail to focus their attention with equal intensity on
all points in the transaction. It thus includes the rules that specific
terms outweigh general terms, express terms outweigh courses of per-
formance and trade usages, and separately negotiated terms outweigh
standardized terms.
25
Both classicists and neoclassicists use these rules, but they justify
them on different grounds. Take the rule favoring interpretation in
accordance with generally prevailing meaning as an example. The
classicist would impose it on contracting parties as a requirement. The
neoclassicist would rely on it only absent a contrary showing of actual
intent, reasoning that the parties probably shared its underlying as-
sumption, and therefore that its use probably will advance their ac-
tual expectations.
The neoclassicist would find it especially easy to justify using
these rules to ascertain the meaning of terms in debt contracts govern-
ing large loans. Trust indenture and loan agreement forms tend to be
inspected again and again by experienced corporate lawyers as they
attempt to provide answers to all forseeable questions within the four
corners of the document. Such lawyers expect their contracts to be
interpreted in accord with standard English usage and standard rules
of interpretation. Thus, the standard rules will tend to produce mean-
ings corresponding to the meanings attached by the drafters of such
well-drafted contracts, and, presumably, thereby will protect the
expectations of the interested parties.
C. Construction Against the Drafter
This section considers the application to debt contracts of another
hornbook rule of interpretation-the maxim of interpretation contra
Id. §§ 202(1)-(2), 203(a).
25 Id. § 203(b)-(d).
Courts make ample use of these rules of interpretation in debt contract cases. See, e.g.,
Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 947 (5th Cir.)(en bane) (effect to all terms), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Prescott, Ball & Turben v. LTV Corp., 531 F. Supp. 213, 218
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 521 F. Supp. 104,
127-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (specific terms over general terms), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 691 F.2d
1039 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1253 (1983); Zeiler v. Work Wear Corp., 450 F.
Supp. 891, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (effect to all terms).
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projerentem, or, interpretation against the drafter. The Restatement
(Second) styles this a rule of "construction" as well as interpretation.
26
Corbin calls it a rule of "last resort. ' 27 Either way, the judge applies it
only when the process of interpretation produces two or more reason-
able meanings and he needs a basis for choosing among them. 28 Un-
derlying the rule is the assumption that the drafter knows more than
the other parties about the document's inner workings and inherent
ambiguities. The rule alleviates this inherent informational disparity
by forcing him to accomplish his purposes clearly and in plain view.
29
As such, it provides a tool for judicial regulation of the imposition of
standard form contracts by parties with superior bargaining power.
Courts routinely invoke the rule in debt contract cases. 30 This
seems appropriate at first glance. Debt contracts follow standard
forms. Their complexity makes it possible for a drafter to bury a
surprise directive unfavorable to the other side deep within the form's
convoluted paragraphs. But further inspection leads to questions as to
28 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 comment a (1981). The Restatement (Second)
catalogues this traditional rule with a group of rules described as embodying considerations of
"fairness and the public interest." E.g., id. §§ 205, 208 (good faith; unconscionability).
27 3 A. Corbin, Contracts § 559 (1960).
18 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Common-
wealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 616 (S.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 598 F,2d 1109 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979).
21 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 comment a (1981).
10 See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 947 n.20 (5th Cir.)(en banc), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
Calling "contra proferentem" a "rule" overstates matters somewhat. In practice, the doc-
trine is so maleable that it rarely keeps a court from doing as it pleases. Consider three debt
contract cases, each decided in the Southern District of New York.
In Prescott, Ball & Turben v. LTV Corp., 531 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court
began its discussion by noting that it was bound by "the basic rule of contract construction which
requires a court to resolve ambiguities in an agreement against the party which drafted the
agreement." Id. at 217. "[T]he only way in which defendants may prevail," the court went on,
"is if the terms of the Trust Indenture [are] unambiguously ... clear." Id. But the defendants
prevailed anyway, though the language at least was ambiguous, see infra notes 76-80 and
accompanying text. The court had no trouble ordering its inquiry to avoid the doctrine's
constraints.
In Zeiler v. Work Wear Corp., 450 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court avoided
imposing the "rule" on the issuer defendant as follows:
While it is true that this general rule of contractual interpretation applies to obliga-
tions found in debentures, the central task of the court is always to discern the actual
intent of the parties, not to penalize any of them for failing to clarify the meaning of
a given provision. The terms of the debentures must therefore be "fairly construed in
light of the context and all surrounding circumstances," no matter who was responsi-
ble for drafting them.
Id. at 894 (citation omitted). For authority, the court cited Buchman v. American Foam Rubber
Corp., 250 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), a case that also advanced the proposition that "doubt
or ambiguity is generally said to be resolved against the issuing corporation." Id. at 75.
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whether the factual assumptions supporting the rule obtain in the debt
contract context. Take first a loan agreement drafted for a private
placement between a large corporate borrower and an institutional
lender. Judicial intervention to adjust an imbalance of bargaining
power seems unnecessary. So long as both sides are represented by
experienced counsel, the potential for drafting abuse seems unlikely to
be realized. The more experienced the counsel, the more arbitrary a
judicial decision based on parties' allocation of drafting responsibili-
ties at the negotiating table.
3'
Trust indentures present a different problem, as they tend to be
drafted by counsel for the underwriters. The underwriters cease to be
parties interested in the contract immediately after the securities'
initial issue and sale. As a result, when a dispute between the issuer
and the bondholders arises at some later date, there is no drafter
against whom to interpret. The issuer might be selected as a second
choice, since it attended the negotiations and had the power to influ-
ence the drafting. But this seems a tenuous basis for ascribing to it an
outcome-determinative fault. Particular issuers have no real role in
drafting the boilerplate in standard trust indenture forms. The very
need for standardization makes it unlikely that anyone involved in the
transaction would propose changes in such language. Moreover, the
public availability of standard trust indenture forms gives institutional
bond investors equal reason to know of their contents and equal long-
term ability to influence the drafting process.
3 2
D. Context v. Plain Meaning
The goal of protecting the parties' expectations makes neoclassi-
cal interpretation utterly flexible. Thus, the foregoing "relational
33
31 Of course, one could inquire into the relative capabilities of the parties' respective counsel
and base the rule's application on the result. Courts have occasionally done so. See, e.g., Gulf Oil
Corp. v. American La. Pipe Line Co., 282 F.2d 401, 404 (6th Cir. 1960) (noting that counsel
was "skilled in this field of the law"); Weiland Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Whitney, 44 Ill. 2d 105, 111,
251 N.E.2d 242, 248 (1969) (noting that drafter was "a lawyer with a number of years ...
experience as a legal advisor in commercial transactions"). But determined pursuit of the inquiry
probably would produce a complex collateral jurisprudence unappealing to the bar and lacking
in both efficiency and fairness. At all events, competent counsel fairly can be assumed in respect
of all of the debt contract cases this Article discusses.
32 But it must also be noted that less sophisticated individual bond investors will not have this
long-term ability to influence the drafting process. Faulting such investors for the unused power
of richer and better-informed investors may be unfair.
In Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 947 n.20 (5th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 956 (1981), the Fifth Circuit suggests that holders, as purchasers from underwriters,
could be found to stand in the underwriters' shoes for purposes of interpretation contra proferen-
turn. The text above is intended to rebut this suggestion.
"s See Macneil, supra note 6, at 886-89. Elsewhere, Professor Macneil argues that debt
contracts may not be "relational." Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its
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alterations of neoclassical rules for the debt contract context advance
neoclassical ends. The only absolute in neoclassical interpretation is
the flexible rule that words be "interpreted in light of all the circum-
stances, ' 34 and the rule's supporting assumption that words do not
have immutable meanings. A corollary also bears mention: The more
one knows about the context in which the words are used, the more
likely that one's interpretation will accord with the parties' expecta-
tions.
This neoclassical contextualism undercuts the classical require-
ment that parties clearly manifest their expectations in standard En-
glish prose. This conflict between the two schools customarily arises
with respect to the admission of extrinsic evidence of meaning. The
classicists employ standard English usage as a bar to an expanded
inquiry into context-if the meaning of the words is "plain" to the
judge, no extrinsic evidence as to meaning is admissible; evidence is
admissible only if the words are unclear when read within the four
corners of the document. 35 In contrast, the neoclassical denial of the
immutability of words causes the plain meaning bar to disappear. If
one has no way of knowing whether or not the language is clear until
all the circumstances have been considered, it follows that extrinsic
evidence must be admitted for interpretation purposes despite the
apparent clarity of the text's meaning. 36
The interpretive conflict between plain meaning and context
does not end once extrinsic evidence has been admitted. The court still
must decide which of the two competing meanings, one "plain" and
the other derived from the extrinsic evidence, carries more weight.
Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1018, 1042
(1981). But the analysis in the text will show that they are. Their relational aspects simply are less
fundamental than those of many other contract relations, such as output, requirements and
exclusive dealing contracts.
11 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(1) (1981). For application of the rule in a
debt contract case, see, e.g., Buchman v. American Foam Rubber Corp., 250 F. Supp. 60, 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" For advocacy of the plain meaning rule in contract interpretation, see Holmes, The
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 420 (1899). For a contemporary discus-
sion of the rule's use in statutory interpretation, see Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-
Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 Colum. L.
Rev. 1299 (1975).
16 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 39,
442 P.2d 641, 645, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 565 (1968)(Traynor, C.J.) ("The fact that the terms of an
instrument appear clear to a judge does not preclude the possibility that the parties chose the
language of the instrument to express different terms."); 3 A. Corbin, supra note 27, § 572B
(Supp. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 comment b (1981).
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Neoclassical doctrine specifies no "correct" mode of analysis at this
point. When confronted with two competing meanings, the neoclassi-
cist will, of course, test them out "in the particular context," but will
not discount the force of standard usage. As the late Judge Robert
Braucher, a leading neoclassicist, wrote: "The transaction may be
shown in all its length and breadth, but 'the words themselves remain
the most important evidence of intention; to put them altogether aside
may at times be necessary but it always somewhat savors of usurpa-
tion.' -3
Thus, the decisive stage of neoclassical interpretation consists of
an ad hoc balancing which is cognizant of classical values. Part II of
this Article examines the dynamics of this balancing process in con-
temporary debt contract cases. Part III evaluates the competing inter-
pretive norms available for debt contracts.
II. CASES
Interpretation cases turn on their own facts. Nevertheless, some
generalizations can be made about the dynamics of the decision proc-
ess. The following discussion of debt contract interpretation makes a
few such generalizations. It relies on two assumptions in so doing:
First, contractual language lacks clarity by degrees; and second, judi-
cial intervention in contractual relationships becomes more strongly
justified as the governing contract provisions become less clear.
Two types of cases define the extremes. At one extreme lies the
case of the clear contract provision. Here, the judge plays a passive,
ministerial role, enforcing the provision unless some overriding law or
policy bars the way. Most standard debt contract provisions lie at this
extreme. For example, when, upon a payment default, the lender
accelerates and demands judgment for the entire outstanding princi-
pal amount, the standard form provides clear directions and no inter-
pretation question arises. Such a case rarely results in litigation3 8 since
the expected benefit (here, zero) falls far short of the expected litiga-
tion costs. At the other extreme lies the case of the entirely unclear
contract provision. Here, whether the interpreter reads the provision
37 Braucher, Interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 13, 16-17 (1981) (quoting Robert Indus., Inc. v. Spence, 362 Mass. 751, 755, 291
N.E.2d 407, 410 (1973)(quoting National City Bank v. Goess, 130 F.2d 376, 380 (2d Cir.
1942))).
31 But In re North Am. Acceptance Corp. Sec. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ga. 1981),
discusses an issue stemming from what could be considered a clear provision. The court turns to
the dictionary to give "shall" its imperative meaning with respect to a trust indenture provision
that the trustee "shall" give the holders notice of events of default. Id. at 641.
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within the four corners of the document or within the circumstances
as a whole, interpretation fails to point to any particular meaning,
plain or otherwise. As a result, judicial intervention to supply a term is
a precondition to enforcement. Such a case might arise respecting a
debt contract if a technical financial term were left undefined and
standard business usage offered an array of reasonable denotations.
Few cases arise at this extreme, either, as debt contracts tend to be too
well drafted to leave entire fields of subject matter open to judicial
intervention.
There follows a comparative analysis of seven debt contract
cases, 39 all arising between the poles. The cases deal with contract
provisions lacking clarity in differing degrees and thus raise questions
of proportionately differing degrees of difficulty. Conflicts of propor-
tionately differing intensity arise between plain meanings and mean-
ings derived from context.
A. Cases Interpreting Open-Ended Provisions
Even complex contracts occasionally contain provisions left
vague by design. The drafter structures the provision to cover a con-
cretely envisioned situation. But the drafter recognizes the possibility
of related future situations unforeseeable in many particulars. Consid-
erations of the limits of the human imagination or the politics of the
particular transaction cause postponement of a precise drafting deci-
sion as to these contingencies. The drafter accomplishes this by draft-
ing broadly and vaguely enough to bring such cases within the provi-
sion's arguable scope. Such drafting implicitly invites judicial
intervention to establish the provision's precise parameters. Such pro-
visions appear in all debt contracts.40
The debt contract's standard "successor obligor clause"'" has this
open-ended design. It requires the purchaser of "all or substantially
11 The seven cases do not constitute a complete collection of contemporary debt contract
cases. But the sample is broad enough to afford a basis for this Article's conclusions about the
judicial interpretation process. Other debt contract cases are discussed in Bratton, supra note 12.
40 Such provisions are more prevalent in standard form trust indentures than in loan agree-
ments. Open-ended provisions applicable to borrowers with widely different characteristics serve
the public's need for standardization.
4 The Model Indenture's sample successor obligor clause provides:
The Company shall not consolidate with or merge into any other corporation or
convey or transfer its properties and assets substantially as an entirety to any Person,
unless:
(1) the corporation formed by such consolidation or into which the Company is
merged or the Person which acquires by conveyance or transfer the properties
and assets of the Company substantially as an entirety shall be a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the United States of America or any
[Vol. 5:371
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all" of the borrower's assets to assume the indebtedness governed by
the contract, and makes the purchase of "all or substantially all" of the
borrower's assets by a nonassuming purchaser an event of default. The
phrase "substantially all" is vague and could be drafted more con-
cretely. 42 But it embodies an efficient compromise. The lender wants
the borrower's existing assets, or at least "substantially all" of them,
kept intact to protect its investment. The borrower wants the freedom
both to dispose of minor assets and to effect fundamental corporate
changes without the lender's permission. The "substantially all the
assets" concept, highly developed in corporate law, 43 occupies com-
State or the District of Columbia, and shall expressly assume, by an indenture
supplemental hereto, executed and delivered to the Trustee, in form satisfac-
tory to the Trustee, the due and punctual payment of the principal of (and
premium, if any) and interest on all the Debentures and the performance of
every covenant of this Indenture on the part of the Company to be performed
or observed;
(2) immediately after giving effect to such transaction, no Event of Default,
and no event which, after notice or lapse of time, or both, would become an
Event of Default, shall have happened and be continuing; and
(3) the Company has delivered to the Trustee an Officers' Certificate and an
Opinion of Counsel each stating that such consolidation, merger, conveyance
or transfer and such supplemental indenture comply with this Article and that
all conditions precedent herein provided for relating to such transaction have
been complied with.
ABF Commentaries, supra note 1, at 292 (sample provision § 8-1)
Upon any consolidation or merger, or any conveyance or transfer of the proper-
ties and assets of the Company substantially as an entirety in accordance with
Section 801, the successor corporation formed by such consolidation or into which
the Company is merged or to which such conveyance or transfer is made shall
succeed to, and be substituted for, and may exercise every right and power of, the
Company under this Indenture with the same effect as if such successor corporation
had been named as the Company herein; provided, however, that no such convey-
ance or transfer shall have the effect of releasing the Person named as the "Com-
pany" in the first paragraph of this instrument or any successor corporation which
shall theretofore have become such in the manner prescribed in this Article from its
liability as obligor and maker on any of the Debentures or coupons.
Id. at 295-96 (sample provision § 8-2)(italics in original).
42 For example, a fixed percentage of book value might be set to define "substantially all" the
assets. The Model Indenture appears to reject rigid limitations on an issuer's ability to dispose of
assets. It does provide a sample clause requiring prepayment of a portion of indebtedness as assets
are sold, id. at 427-28 (sample provision § 10-13 example 3), but notes that such clauses are
rarely used, id. at 424. "In most cases," it notes, "no attempt is made to provide a definition of
'substantially all', even though there is no generally recognized definition of that term." Id. at
n . 1 .
43 See Model Business Corp. Act § 79 (1982). See generally Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d
599 (Del. Ch.) (leading case interpreting the "substantially all" concept), aff'd per curiam, 316
A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
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promise ground, substantially protecting each side's interests while
saving the costs of negotiating a more specific provision.
B. S.F. Co. v. Philadelphia National Bank44 concerned a successor
obligor clause governing an investment company borrower. Seventy-
five percent of the value of the borrower's assets lay in a block of
common stock of a single manufacturing company. The borrower sold
this stock, taking the position that the stock did not constitute "sub-
stantially all" of its assets within the meaning of the clause. It drew
upon an old common law doctrine under which assets sold did not
amount to "substantially all" the assets where the sale advanced the
selling corporation's purposes. 45 The borrower had held the stock for
the purpose of maintaining working control over the manufacturing
company, but such working control had been lost. Therefore, it ar-
gued, the sale advanced its purposes, and as such, was not of "substan-
tially all" the assets.
46
The court rebutted this contextual argument with a different
contextual argument. It emphasized the provision's purpose of pro-
tecting the lenders against dissipation of the borrower's asset base. The
debentureholders had relied on the block of stock in valuing the
debentures. Therefore, accomplishing the provision's protective pur-
pose required a finding that "substantially all" the assets had been
sold.
47
The court's result follows from both classical and neoclassical
perspectives. The classicist would agree that the provision's vagueness
necessitates judicial line-drawing. But since seventy-five percent falls
within a very standard usage meaning of "substantially all," the
court's line of reasoning better respects what little integrity the lan-
guage possesses. The language's vagueness prevents the neoclassicist
from being absolutely certain that a given result fully accords with the
parties' expectations. The neoclassicist, accordingly, will make refer-
ence to context in order to ascertain which meaning more probably
advances expectations. In B.S.F., the probabilities favor the meaning
chosen by the court. Tying the debt obligation to the borrower's asset
base is the provision's central business function from the lender's point
of view. The "purpose" test proposed by the borrower, in contrast,
44 42 Del. Ch. 106, 204 A.2d 746 (1964).
45 See, e.g., Lange v. Reservation Mining & Smelting Co., 48 Wash. 167, 93 P. 208 (1908)
(case cited by the issuer in B.S.F.)
46 B.S.F., 42 Del. Ch. at 110, 204 A.2d at 749.
17 Id. at 115, 204 A.2d at 752.
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stems from old law regulating stockholders' relations with the corpo-
rate entity and has no bearing on the business needs of either party.
B.S.F. is a relatively easy case. The more recent Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,48 also involving the standard
successor obligor clause, presented a more difficult problem. There,
the issuer of bonds and debentures liquidated on a piecemeal basis.
First it sold a substantial division. Then it sold a smaller division and
secured its stockholders' approval of a "Plan of Liquidation and Disso-
lution." 49 After this, only one operating division remained. Before the
piecemeal liquidation started, this division had produced thirteen
percent of the issuer's profits and thirty-eight percent of its revenues,
and had comprised thirty-four percent of the book value of its fixed
assets and forty-one percent of its operating assets., 0 The issuer found
a buyer for this division, and the two entered into an agreement
providing that the buyer assume the issuer's outstanding bonds and
debentures.5' The issuer and buyer took the position that this sale
constituted a "sale" of "all assets" within the meaning of the successor
obligor clause, binding-the bond and debentureholders to the buyer's
assumption. Under this analysis, the bond and debentureholders could
not declare a default.52
The bond and debentureholders objected, claiming that, for pur-
poses of applying the successor obligor clause, the issuer's asset base
should have been calculated as of the time the issuer formulated the
plan of liquidation. Under this analysis, the sale of the last operating
division constituted a sale outside of the clause because the division
contained substantially less than one-half of the issuer's assets calcu-
lated at the time of formulation of the plan. Thus, the issuer's subse-
quent dissolution would be deemed to have constituted a default
under the trust indentures .
3
18 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982)(Winter, J.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1253 (1983).
19 Id. at 1045.
50 Id.
11 Id. at 1042-46.
52 Id. at 1049.
11 Id. at 1051. It might be asked why the Sharon Steel holders objected so strenuously to the
assumption. From what appears on the face of the Second Circuit's opinion, the assets of the
purchasing corporation provided better security than the original issuer's assets did prior to the
liquidation. Rising interest rates very probably provide the answer. Given below market coupon
rates on the debentures, it would be rational for the issuing and assuming corporations to
attempt to keep the debt tied to the assets so as to lock in the financing at low cost. Conversely, a
default declaration greatly would benefit the holders. The resulting acceleration of the maturity
date would permit them to realize the difference between the face value and the discounted
value of the debentures.
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The case showed the successor obligor clause working at cross
purposes5 4-the clause's purpose of offering the issuer flexibility in
accomplishing fundamental corporate changes supported one inter-
pretation, while its purpose of keeping the debt obligation tied to the
issuer's asset base supported another. Any decision, therefore, had to
impair one party's expectations to some extent. 55 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit ruled for the holders, breaking this impasse by
assessing the probabilities and adopting the least impairing meaning:
Where contractual language seems designed to protect the interests
of both parties and where conflicting interpretations are argued,
the contract should be construed to sacrifice the principal interests
of each party as little as possible. An interpretation which sacrifices
a major interest of one of the parties while furthering only a
marginal interest of the other should be rejected in favor of an
interpretation which sacrifices marginal interests of both parties in
order to protect their major concerns.5s
The court balanced the interests in favor of the holders. The holders'
interpretation would leave the issuer's interest in flexibility largely
unimpaired; all kinds of fundamental corporate changes still could be
structured within the clause. In contrast, the issuer's interpretation
would open a significant loophole through which issuers could use
sequential liquidations to separate their debt obligations from their
asset bases.
The contextual circumstances favored the holders less heavily
than the Second Circuit's opinion indicates. The Model Indenture
contains a covenant explicitly prohibiting the sort of piecemeal asset
sale and liquidation carried out in Sharon Steel.57 The Sharon Steel
-" The court made appropriately short shrift of a literal reading that favored the issuer.
Under a different literal reading, "assets" could include the undistributed proceeds of the earlier
sales, forestalling application of the clause to the last purchaser. Id. at 1049.
" Farnsworth notes that "purpose interpretation" is a problematic exercise because different
parties to a single contract can have different purposes. He suggests that a "reason to know" test
be used to break the impasse: "It seems proper to regard one party's assent to the agreement with
knowledge of the other party's general purposes as a ground for resolving doubts in favor of a
meaning that will further those ends, rather than a meaning that will frustrate them." E.
Farnsworth, supra note 9, § 7.10, at 494. The problem with this approach is that the fault
identified will not necessarily obtain on either side, or, as in Sharon Steel, it will obtain equally
on both sides.
" Sharon Steel, 691 F.2d at 1051.
17 The Model Indenture provides:
Subject to the provisions of Article Eight, the Company will not convey, transfer or
lease, any substantial part of its assets unless, in the opinion of the Board of
Directors, such conveyance, transfer or lease, considered together with all prior
conveyances, transfers and leases of assets of the Company, would not materially
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trust indentures do not appear to have included it. One can infer from
this that the drafters did not "intend" to extend protection from
piecemeal liquidations. The existence of commentary on the point in
the Model Indenture 58 permits the public holders in the marketplace
to be charged with reason to know of this intention.
But the commentary also permits a conflicting inference to be
drawn. It notes that in practice, the asset sale covenant has been
utilized only rarely. 59 The clause's absence as plausibly could stem
from a market-wide failure to focus on the problem as from a design
to allow piecemeal liquidations. Given such a market-wide failure,
the successor obligor clause's open-ended nature leaves the court with
discretion to decide the question either way. And a court granted this
discretion legitimately might incline toward imposing on the issuer the
burden of drafting a provision explicitly sanctioning an action (such as
a piecemeal liquidation) so destructive of the holders' bargain.
Thus, the contextual evidence respecting the meaning of the
Sharon Steel successor obligor clause gives conflicting signals. Such a
cloudy contextual picture makes it difficult to justify a given interpre-
tation on the ground that it more likely protects the parties' expecta-
tions. 60 The judicial decision, accordingly, begins to become a matter
of allocating the drafting burden, and the judge begins to displace the
parties as law-giver in the relationship. Drafting burdens, whether
imposed for reasons of efficiency or fairness, amount to norms im-
posed on the parties. The Second Circuit's "purpose" interpretation of
the successor obligor clause in Sharon Steel, for all its conscientious
cognizance of the parties' business expectations, in part may reflect
the court's intuition regarding the fair allocation of benefits and bur-
dens in debt transactions.
B. Cases Interpreting Closed-Ended Provisions
Contract drafters occasionally design provisions to cover only one
concrete situation. Judicial contraction or expansion of such provisions
is neither contemplated nor invited. All debt contracts contain such
and adversely affect the interest of the Holders of the Debentures or the ability of the
Company to meet its obligations as they become due.
ABF Commentaries, supra note 1, at 426-27 (sample provision § 10-13 example 1).
" Id. at 423.
" Id. at n.l.
60 We thus approach neoclassical "construction," where the court, rather than the parties,
determines the legal effect of the language. See 3 A. Corbin, supra note 27, § 534.
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provisions. Some, such as payment, repayment and redemption provi-
sions, regulate the course of the transaction. Others, such as business
covenants, regulate the course of the issuer's business.
6 1
When these highly technical provisions give rise to interpretive
disputes, classical and neoclassical values can come into sharp con-
flict. For example, an event might occur which, under a literal read-
ing, falls within the scope of the provision. But consideration of
contextual evidence might demonstrate that the same event probably
lies outside of the discrete class of events contemplated by the drafter
and, if included in the class, would probably frustrate expectations.
Here, classical values point to the literal meaning while neoclassical
reference to context counsels a narrower reading. In contrast, an event
might occur which, under a literal reading, lies outside the scope of
the provision. But contextual evidence could indicate that including
the event within the scope of the provision probably will protect
expectations. Again, classical and neoclassical values point in different
directions. Things get more complicated still if nothing in the lan-
guage or circumstances clearly indicates whether the drafter contem-
plated a closed- or open-ended class of transactions or events.
Harris v. Union Electric Co." 2 concerned a provision in the sup-
plemental indenture governing an issue of bonds. The provision pro-
hibited any redemption effectuated with the proceeds of a debt issue
bearing a lower coupon rate, or preferred stock having a lower divi-
dend payment rate, than that of the issue governed by the indenture.
A parenthetical in the provision excepted redemptions from a "main-
tenance fund." This maintenance fund had been set up in earlier
supplemental indentures and was intended to force a partial redemp-
tion to the extent the issuer had failed to devote fifteen percent of any
year's earnings to property maintenance. The issuer had always satis-
fied the requirement with actual investment in property.6 3 Unfortu-
nately for the bondholders, the earlier supplemental indentures lim-
ited neither the source of money nor the occasion for use of the
maintenance fund. Taking advantage of these loopholes, the issuer
floated a new issue of bonds at a lower coupon rate, put the proceeds
in the maintenance fund and redeemed the original bonds at face
value out of the maintenance fund.6 4 It thereby avoided the redemp-
61 Business covenants tend to be more extensive and complicated in heavily negotiated
private placement and bank loan agreements than in public issue trust indentures.
62 622 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
61 Id. at 244-45.
4 Id. at 242.
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tion prohibition (along with a redemption premium also provided for
in the supplemental indenture).
A literal reading of the indentures supported the issuer's right of
redemption. But all contextual evidence, including the subjective un-
derstanding of officers of the issuer, pointed to the opposite result-
that the bonds had redemption protection.65 A "glitch" probably lay
behind this mess; the drafter failed to mark up and splice together the
constituent forms so as successfully to manifest the deal contemplated
by the parties."
6
Harris does not involve facially vague or ambiguous language.
The Harris debt contract is clear when read within its four corners.
The interpretation problem becomes apparent only when the context
is considered.6 7 The choice between classical and neoclassical alterna-
tives could not be more clear. Strict classicism permits the court to
remove the discordant contextual elements from its field of vision.
Neoclassicism permits it to intervene in the relationship, in effect to
"5 Neoclassical interpretation might have led to a different result regarding another fund
created in the Harris indenture, the so-called "improvement fund." This fund was excepted from
the refunding limitation in the same parenthetical as the maintenance fund. But, unlike the
maintenance fund, the availability of this fund was limited to one percent of the issue per year.
Id. at 243. Thus, as to the improvement fund, a court could apply the parenthetical and
interpret all parts of the documents consistently while simultaneously substantially protecting the
expectations of all parties.
The evidence mentioned in the opinion shows that no one involved with the transactions
foresaw that the maintenance fund could be used to circumvent the refunding limitation. Id. at
248.
The "glitch" seems to have been repeated in other deals. Substantially the same question
arose in John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 717 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.
1983) (discussed infra note 68). Indirectly confirming this Article's characterization of the
problem as a "glitch," the Carolina Power bondholders requested reformation of the contract
(albeit without success). 717 F.2d at 671.
67 The great pathological bond decision of the depression era, see J. Kennedy & R. Landau,
Corporate Trust Administration and Management 142-43 (2d ed. 1975), that of the district court
in Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), rev'd, 85 F.2d
61 (2d Cir. 1936), is similar in this respect. The question in Kelly was whether a standard
negative pledge clause covered secured bank borrowings. At first glance, the language did seem
to cover such bank borrowings. But the court took a closer look both at the language and
particular bank borrowings and discovered a bad fit. The language of the covenant contem-
plated mortgages or pledges created by the same instrument governing the underlying debt
obligation, and the particular pledges and bank borrowings had been created pursuant to
different instruments. Not resting on a mere technicality, the court went further to show
hypothetical circumstances in which application of the negative pledge clause to secured bank
borrowings would block a deal beneficial to all parties. 11 F. Supp. at 504.
The Kelly court's mistake lay in taking the contextual inquiry only halfway. Further
hypotheticals would have shown that its hypertechnical reading drained the clauses' protective
content and frustrated the debentureholders' expectations.
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rewrite the contract to accord with the context. The Harris court
chose the classical alternative. 8 It found the language "unambiguous
on its face," and permitted the force of the "unambiguous" language
to outweigh the contextual evidence.
69
C. Cases Interpreting Provisions Unclear in Scope
There follows a comparative discussion of four cases, each of
which concerns a vaguely designed provision susceptible to both
closed- and open-ended interpretation. As the cases show, such vague-
ness makes the meaning of such provisions highly sensitive to contex-
tual influence. The discussion closes by returning to the Second Cir-
cuit's Sharon Steel opinion to examine its treatment of a second, more
difficult interpretation question.
Zeiler v. Work Wear Corp.70 concerned a dispute that arose
when an issuer of debentures was required to divest a block of assets
68 As did the Second Circuit when a slightly different version of the same question came up in
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 717 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1983).
Carolina Power concerned privately placed utility bonds. As in Harris, the utility redeemed
the bonds with cash deposited in a "maintenance fund," thereby circumventing a refunding
limitation. But the issue of interpretation was slightly different. In Carolina Power, the refund-
ing limitation applied only to "general redemptions" provided for in one paragraph of the
governing supplemental indenture; maintenance fund redemptions were "special redemptions"
provided for in a separate paragraph of the indenture. No plausible reading of the language
could have brought "special redemptions" within the scope of the refunding limitation. The
bondholders took a different tack, going to the provisions governing the maintenance fund and
arguing that these did not provide for cash redemptions in respect of years during which property
maintenance expenditures equalled or exceeded the minimum fifteen percent of gross revenues.
They took the position that the phrase "Property additions . . . which the Company elects to
make the basis of a credit" required the issuer to apply all available maintenance expenditures to
satisfy the maintenance fund requirement, limiting its "election" to the choice of particular
properties to be applied to the maintenance fund in case of an excess. Id. at 667-68 (emphasis in
original).
The issuer took the position that the phrase permitted the issuer to "elect" between a cash
redemption and application to the fund of available maintenance expenditures. Id. at 666-67.
The Second Circuit decided for the issuer, citing the "plain language" of the disputed clause, id.
at 669, and not very much else.
The case was not as clear cut as the Second Circuit indicated. The court's reading surely
respected the language, history and purpose of the special redemption provision at issue. Even
so, the language by no means compelled the result. Furthermore, respect for the purpose and
history of the refunding limitation points to a result in the bondholders' favor. The court's
classical "plain meaning" rationale cuts off the possibility of a balancing analysis like that
utilized by a different panel of the same court in Sharon Steel. See supra text accompanying notes
48-56.
69 For other glitches respecting closed-ended provisions, see Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp.
v. New York Trust Co., 184 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1950) (anti-dilution provision governing war-
rants); Mueller v. Howard Aircraft Corp., 329 I11. App. 570, 70 N.E.2d 203 (1946) (call
provision).
70 450 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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pursuant to an antitrust consent decree. The issuer accomplished the
divestiture by spinning off to its shareholders the stock of a newly
created subsidiary to which the assets had been transferred. A deben-
tureholder claimed that the divestiture came within a standard trust
indenture provision creating an event of default in case: "[The issuer]
shall ...be adjudicated a bankrupt or a court ...shall enter an
order . . approving a petition filed against it seeking reorganization
* . .under the Federal bankruptcy laws or any other ... statute of
the United States . . .or any State .... 71
Under a literal reading, the provision picked up an antitrust
divestiture as a "reorganization ...under [a] ... statute of the
United States." But, of course, "reorganization" also can be given a
more closed-ended reading as a category limited to insolvency reor-
ganization proceedings.
Interpretive rules of preference favor the narrow reading, as did
the Zeiler court. 72 The ejusdem generis73 maxim, with its bias against
broad readings, comes to bear. Further, the narrow reading better
suits the structure of the standard trust indenture. The standard form
explicitly covers asset dispositions in its business covenants rather than
in default provisions, such as that at issue in Zeiler.74 And, as shown
by the foregoing discussion of the successor obligor clause, the business
covenants tend to treat asset dispositions flexibly, avoiding the sort of
per se treatment this default clause applies to "reorganizations." Nor
do any facts indicate that the narrower reading might have frustrated
the debentureholders' expectations.7 5 We have, in sum, an easy case in
71 Id. at 894.
72 Id. at 896 ("even if... the intent of the paragraph were . . . somewhat unclear. . . the
Court would still be obliged to limit the expansive phrase ...to the confines of the specific
language which precedes it").
71 Or "of the same kind"; that is, provisions should be assumed to include only the genre
specifically mentioned. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 8, § 7.11, at 496-97; 3 A. Corbin, supra
note 27, § 552.
7' The Zeiler court noted this fact as well, and pointed out that "[n]o such covenants appear
in the debentures which form the subject matter of this lawsuit." 450 F. Supp. at 895; see also
ABF Commentaries, supra note 1, at 205 ("a court could hold that an antitrust divestiture was
not a voluntary disposition in violation of the applicable covenant restricting dipositions of assets
and therefore would not constitute a 'default' under that covenant").
71 Even if the holder had proved that a contrary understanding was widespread in the
market place, a strong "reason to know" argument was available in rebuttal. As the court noted,
the ABF Commentaries, supra note 1, at 204, contain an explanation of the purpose of the
provision inconsistent with the holder's profered meaning. 450 F. Supp. at 895. The Model
Indenture being publicly available, the court reasoned, all holders have "reason to know" of a
prevailing narrow interpretation. Id.
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which all contextual evidence, internal and external, points to the
same clarifying limitation. No classical/neoclassical conflict occurs.
Prescott, Ball & Turben v. LTV Corp.76 also involved the mean-
ing of "reorganization" in respect of the spin-off of the stock of a
subsidiary, but "reorganization" as used in a different standard inden-
ture provision. The question was whether the holders of an issue of
convertible subordinated debentures had a right to convert into the
spun-off stock. The holders claimed conversion rights under the fol-
lowing provision:
In case of any capital reorganization ... each Debenture shall
... be convertible into the kind and amount of shares of stock or
other securities or property . . . to which the holder of the number
of shares of Common Stock deliverable (immediately prior to the
time of such capital reorganization .. .) upon conversion of such
Debenture would have been entitled upon such capital reorganiza-
tion .... 77
The holders argued for an open-ended interpretation: "reorganiza-
tion" as including any "reshuffling" of capital structure. 78 The issuer
suggested a narrower meaning limiting "reorganizations" to recapital-
izations involving the exchange of one form of participation in the
issuer for another.
79
The court employed the rule favoring interpretations promoting
internal consistency of the document. The trust indenture's notice
provision required that the holders be given notice of "record" dates in
the case of dividends, and "effective" dates of reorganizations, mer-
gers, and a number of other transactions. Since the spin-off was a
"dividend" for notice purposes, internal consistency precluded its be-
ing deemed a "reorganization."80
A look at the broader context reinforces the court's conclusion.
Here, as in Zeiler, a standard provision more clearly designed to
regulate the transaction can be found elsewhere in the standard trust
indenture. The provision deals with the impact of dividends on con-
version rights and includes spin-offs. 8 ' It is broadly permissive. There-
fore, whether or not the holders disliked the spin-off's negative effect
76 531 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
77 Id. at 215.
71 Id. at 218 (citing Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932 (Del. 1979)).
71 Id. at 219.
80 Id. at 219-21.
" See Bratton, supra note 12.
[Vol. 5:371
DEBT CONTRACT
on the value of their conversion privilege, they had some "reason to
know" of their exposure. This makes neoclassical protection of their
contrary expectations difficult to justify. Here again, neoclassical and
classical analyses point to the same, comparatively certain result.
Buchman v. American Foam Rubber Corp.82 involved yet an-
other vague corporate term-"dividend." In this case, both the stock
and debt of the issuer were closely held, the debtholder being the
infant child of a member of the stockholder group. The question was
whether a member of the ownership group receiving severance pay in
connection with his simultaneous resignation and sale of stock to other
members of the group received a "dividend" within the meaning of a
debt contract prohibition. The court gave the term a narrow reading.
To be a "dividend," it held, the payment had to be declared by the
board and paid pro rata to all stockholders. Under a more open-ended
reading, "dividend" could include any payment made by the corpora-
tion in respect of ownership of common stock. The court rejected this
reading, citing the understanding of the average businessman.8 3
The court's intuition regarding business understanding may have
been ill founded. It is not immediately apparent that business persons
would form expectations about the meaning of "dividend" based on
corporate law concepts rather than on economic concepts. The under-
standing of the average business lawyer or judge may be another
matter entirely. Even so, no serious neoclassical challenge can be
brought against Buchman's result. The limited number of parties
involved make inferences regarding subjective intent an appropriate
basis for decision. 84 Intent that "dividend" be construed narrowly can
be inferred from the ownership group's acquiescence at the time of the
transaction and for years thereafter.85
But a factual variation on Buchman can be hypothesized which
would tempt a neoclassicist to attach a different meaning to the same
language. All that is needed is to make the debt publicly held and
8 250 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
83 Id. at 75-76 ("Without evidence that the term 'dividend' was accorded a special or
unusual connotation by the contracting parties ... that term must be given no more and no less
than the scope of its ordinary meaning in the context used.").
84 Id. at 73 ("It is noted at the outset that courts are not unfamiliar with the informalities,
often irregularties, commonly attendant upon carrying out of the affairs of the closely-held
corporation.").




traded. Now, no subjective element or waiver provides a basis for
choosing between the competing broad and narrow meanings. A court
would have to look elsewhere in the context for clarifying circum-
stances. Thus, contextual variations affect the clarity of the language.
Broad v. Rockwell International Corp.86 presents a real interpre-
tive conflict as sharp as that just hypothesized in respect of Buchman.
The case arose when an issuer of convertible debentures was taken
over by means of a successful cash tender offer and subsequent cash-
out of the issuer's remaining minority shareholders. The issuer and
acquiror took the position that upon the merger's consummation, the
holders could convert only into the amount of cash they would have
received had they converted their debentures into common stock of
the issuer immediately before the merger. The indenture trustee and
the debentureholders took the position that the conversion rights car-
ried over after the merger to the common stock of the acquiror.
The issue before the Broad court was whether cash consideration
was "other property" within the meaning of an antidilution clause in
the indenture, providing that the holders' conversion rights be trans-
ferred to the "stock, securities or other property" received in the
merger by the issuer's common stockholders. If "other property" in-
cluded cash, then the provision froze the value of the conversion rights
at the amount of the cash consideration.
The issuer had a strong case. A literal reading of the contested
provision favored it: "Cash" falls within a standard definition of
"property." And the Broad court was nothing if not literal. 87 A court's
duty, it wrote, is to "give the words and phrases employed in the
contract their plain meaning."88
A contextual argument also was available to the issuer. Standard
antidilution provisions tend to have an open-ended design. Thus, the
issuer's open-ended reading, sweeping in all conceivable corporate
combinations, was consistent with the overall scheme.
A strong contextual argument also can be advanced on behalf of
the holder's interpretation. The standard contract clause at issue ante-
dated statutory provisions permitting cash-out mergers.89 The cash-
88 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
s See id. at 948-51. The court's step-by-step approach may be seen as fortitudinous or ham-
handed, depending on one's point of view.
88 Id. at 948.
80 At the time the Broad trust indenture was executed, the corporate law of the issuer's state
of incorporation did not permit cash out mergers. Id. at 951; see Bratton, supra note 12.
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out merger therefore could be characterized as a "new development"
outside the universe of possible transactions contemplated by the pro-
visions' drafters. This analysis leaves the provision open-ended, but
not quite so open-ended as to encompass a development as radical as
the cash-out merger without explicit amendment. The bondholders
also could point to the standard antidilution provisions' purpose of
protecting their investment in the conversion privilege and the mar-
kets' expectations that the standard language effectively achieves this
purpose.
Broad closely resembles Harris.0 In both cases, classical consider-
ations point strongly toward one interpretation, while neoclassical
contextual inquiry gives rise to a conflicting signal. And the Fifth
Circuit's approach in Broad resembles that of the Harris court. The
issuer wins in both cases due to the weight put on classical "plain
meaning" considerations.
D. Good Faith
We return to the Second Circuit's Sharon Steel opinion. But,
having considered that case's interpretation of the standard successor
obligor clause, we move on to its second phase, in which the court
interprets standard redemption provisions. Here, the Second Circuit
ascribes a very open-ended meaning to an apparently closed-ended
provision by making good faith considerations override both contract
language and the parties' probable expectations. This interpretation
entails a degree of judicial intervention remarkable in the context of
debt contracts.
The Sharon Steel bondholders, having established that the at-
tempted assumption constituted an event of default, took the position
that the trust indenture's redemption provision covered the issuer's
piecemeal liquidation. As a result, they argued, the issuer owed them
a redemption premium in addition to principal and accrued interest.9'
The issuer responded that it owed no premium because it had not
exercised the redemption provisions. The holders' claim to principal
and interest arose not from redemption, but from their own declara-
tions of default and concomitant acceleration of the debt's maturity.9 2
0 See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
91 Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 521 F. Supp. 118, 127 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1253 (1983).
92 521 F. Supp. at 127-28.
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The district court agreed with the issuer.9 3 It invoked the rule of
preference under which specific provisions-here the default provi-
sions-prevail over general provisions-here the redemption provi-
sions. 94 The Second Circuit reversed, relying on a purpose interpreta-
tion. The purpose of the redemption provisions was to "put a price
upon the voluntary satisfaction of a debt before the date of matur-
ity."9 5 The issuer's actions fell within this purpose, amounting to "a
voluntary liquidation which included plans for payment and satisfac-
tion of the public debt."9 " In effect, the holders requested-and got-
specific performance of the redemption provision.
This purpose interpretation runs counter to the standard debt
contract's language, structure and purpose. First, the interpretation's
characterization of the redemption provisions' purpose is overly
broad. The provisions grant the issuer a right in the nature of an
option. The issuer exercises this option when doing so advances its
interests. 97 Thus, while "voluntary," the provisions serve a much nar-
rower purpose than the Second Circuit indicates. Second, the inter-
pretation relies on incorrect assumptions about the technical operation
of the provisions. They come into play only when the issuer follows
certain procedures; voluntary liquidations do not of themselves acti-
vate them. The procedures were not followed in Sharon Steel.,8
Thus, while a liquidating issuer is free to exercise its option to
declare a redemption, nothing in the standard trust indenture requires
it to do so. Its failure to do so does not leave the holders without a
right to declare the entire principal amount of the debt and accrued
interest due and payable. The liquidating issuer eventually will de-
fault on its covenant to maintain its corporate existence, thus permit-
03 Id.
04 Id.
15 691 F.2d at 1053.
96 Id.
97 Redemption provisions protect the issuer against a decline in the cost of money. For the
price of the premium, the issuer can refund the issue whenever it finds the cost of money
advantageous. See J. Kennedy & R. Landau, supra note 67, at 188. According to Kennedy and
Landau, voluntary redemption provisions reserve to the obligor "the privilege of prepaying...
at its option." Id. Despite the Second Circuit's emphasis on voluntariness, the mainspring of
Sharon Steel was the issuer's attempt to avoid repaying the issue.
98 Redemption entails setting a call date, see ABF Commentaries, supra note 1, at 481
(sample provision § 2-2). No such call date was designated in Sharon Steel. The debt had become
due and payable by virtue of the holders' actions of acceleration rather than by virtue of the
issuer's exercise of the redemption option.
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ting the holders to accelerate. 9 Ultimately, dissolution matures all
indebtedness by operation of state law.100
None of this denies the subterfuge and bad faith implicit in the
Sharon Steel issuer's liquidation and repayment by default. But in the
highly stylized world of the trust indenture, bad faith and subterfuge
do not bar the conclusion that default provisions may be utilized to
advance the issuer's interests. Nor do they compel the Second Circuit's
conclusion that redemption provisions were designed to regulate self-
interested behavior.
In sum, the probabilities regarding marketplace expectations lie
on the side of the issuer's interpretation of the Sharon Steel redemp-
tion provisions. Nothing in the standard trust indenture gives the
market reason to believe that issuers must pay premiums in respect of
voluntary liquidations. Nor has past judicial treatment of debt con-
tracts given the market cause to believe that such a premium might be
interpolated judicially.
All of this makes Sharon Steel hard to defend, even under neo-
classical principles. By overlooking strong signals suggesting align-
ment between marketplace expectations and the issuer's interpreta-
tion, the decision effectively frustrates expectations. Cases like Broad
are distinguishable for, in them, the probabilities regarding market-
place expectations are much less clear and the ambit of judicial discre-
tion correspondingly much wider.
But further reflection shows that even Sharon Steel may lie
within the ambit of neoclassical judicial discretion. Recall that lan-
guage is unclear by degrees. Nothing in the Sharon Steel trust inden-
tures stated with one hundred percent clarity that the issuer owed no
premium. Even though the probabilities regarding expectations
pointed toward that interpretation, and even though such probabili-
ties make up the weightiest variable in neoclassical analysis, other
variables also can be considered. Good faith is a variable in neoclassi-
cal interpretation-a variable available to override expectations in the
rare case. 1 01 The Second Circuit, in effect, selected Sharon Steel as one
99 See ABF Commentaries, supra note 1, at 326 (sample provision § 10-7). The Model
Indenture's list of "events of default" does not include "dissolution" or "liquidation." Id. at 204-
214 (sample provision § 5-1).
100 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1005(a)(2) (McKinney 1963).
The Second Circuit's "specific performance" characterization of the holder's claim, 691
F.2d at 1053, also makes no sense. One cannot get specific performance of the rights of the other
party to the contract.
101 Cf. Speidel, supra note 10, at 795-96 (commenting on the Restatement (Second)'s "reason
to know" test: "there is room for policy to color the edges of inference").
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of these rare cases. The opinion reflects the judgment that the issuer's
bad faith course of conduct makes a result other than that chosen by
the parties the fairest result. 102
E. Summary
B.S.F., Zeiler, LTV and Buchman are easy cases. In each, the
literal reading and the contextual inquiry point to the same meaning.
Both constituencies are satisfied. The classicist has respected the lan-
guage, and the neoclassicist can be confident that the interpretation
advances the parties' expectations.
When, as in these cases, the evidence sends a discernible signal
that a given meaning in all probability protects the parties' expecta-
tions, interpretation becomes doubly easy. By attaching that mean-
ing, the parties make the law and the court comes as close as it can to
inserting the proverbial provision the parties would have inserted had
they thought about the matter. This promotes efficiency,10 3 and also
solves the fairness problem by allowing the parties to define the fair
result for themselves.
Harris, Broad, the hypothetical variation on Buchman and both
phases of Sharon Steel are more difficult. In each, the literal reading
and the contextual inquiry point in different directions, creating clas-
sical/neoclassical conflicts. The variant signals make the cases doubly
difficult for the neoclassicist. The probabilities regarding the parties'
expectations are less clear cut, forcing the neoclassicist to look to
sources other than the parties for law leading to efficient and fair
results. In Broad and Harris the courts turn to classical principles.
Sharon Steel suggests resort to neoclassical good faith principles and
goes so far as to give them determinative weight. The final section of
this Article evaluates these alternative approaches to the difficult debt
contract interpretation case.
III. INTERPRETIVE NORMS FOR DEBT CONTRACTS
The Broad court resolved the interpretation question before it
with the help of two classical rules. First, contract provisions are
"I: Even if this strikes the reader as fancy but hollow reasoning shoring up a weak interpreta-
tion case, the result still might be defended as punitive damages responding to the issuer's willful
breach of the contract. Of course, this association of a redemption "premium" with a "penalty"
might make many lawyers uncomfortable. Practitioners (presumably) give opinions that re-
demption premiums are enforceable obligations based on the analysis that the premium is a
compensatory liquidated damages provision and in no way a "penalty."
103 Or so Professor (now Judge) Posner tells us. See Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and
Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Stud. 83, 88-89 (1977).
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either ambiguous or unambiguous as a matter of law. Second, con-
flicts between competing meanings are resolved in favor of "plain
meaning," absent some "compelling reason."'
0 4
A neoclassicist would criticize both rules. The first rests on an
overly simplified view of the world. Vagueness and ambiguity are not
binary concepts; they arise by degree. The precise degree of ambiguity
in a given case can be ascertained only by reference to context. The
second rule amounts to a presumption against inferring meaning from
context. Such a presumption unduly risks frustration of justified ex-
pectations.
Ironically, both rules also can be defended on contextual
grounds. The Broad opinion makes such a neoclassically inspired
argument. It surveys the trust indenture's history and economic func-
tion, concluding that certain and consistent interpretation aids the
bond market. 0 5 Since these classically biased rules promote certainty
and consistency, they are the rules best suited to the debt contract
context. An evaluation of this position follows.1
0 6
A. Certainty and Expectations
Legal certainty in corporate debtor-creditor relationships does
produce economic benefits. Uncertainty as to the parties' rights and
duties makes debt securities riskier and therefore less valuable. This
uncertainty also makes the valuation process more costly.
A three-pronged argument supports Broad's proposition that clas-
sically inspired rules promote certainty. First, classical rules restrict
the scope of the interpretation inquiry. This limits the range of inter-
pretations to which a given contract is legally susceptible, increasing
the likelihood that transacting parties will arrive at a common inter-
104 Broad, 642 F.2d at 948-51. The court comes close to repeating the hoary classical rule that
plain meaning controls unless it would lead to "absurdity" or "inconsistency." See Braucher,
supra note 37, at 14.
105 Broad, 642 F.2d at 940-46, 947-48 & n.20. Interestingly, similar conscientiousness was
displayed by the district judge in Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497,
503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), rev'd, 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1936) (discussed supra note 67).
10" The proposition to be examined is not entirely novel. Professor Speidel has noted that the
twentieth century tendency towards contextualizing standards may have to be held in check in
those contexts requiring more "guidance to, and control over, both the parties and the court"
than open-ended neoclassical guidelines provide. Speidel, supra note 10, at 789-92. Compare
also Professor Farnsworth's advocacy of an "objective" approach to standard form contracts as
promotive of consistency and certainty. This "objective" approach entails not a wholesale
reversion to classicism, but only the exclusion of evidence as to particular parties' subjective




pretation. The neoclassical inquiry does the opposite by increasing the
range of possible legal interpretations. The second phase of Sharon
Steel aggravates this neoclassical error by introducing an additional
unnecessary interpretive variable-judicial punishment of selfish be-
havior. Second, the narrow classical inquiry forces parties to draft
clearly and thoroughly to protect their own expectations. 107 While this
may entail additional transaction costs, the savings due to greater
certainty very well may be greater. 108 Finally, as the Broad court
emphasized, classical rules keep the jury out of the picture. 109 Jury
participation makes the interpretation process less certain. Classical
rules apply as a "matter of law," while neoclassical contextual inquir-
ies generate questions of fact for the jury.
The classicist could add to this argument a rebuttal of the neo-
classical position that classical interpretation frustrates expectations.
Debt contracts are well and thoroughly drafted. Their competent
drafters contemplate the imposition of classical norms. Therefore,
classical rules will advance the parties' expectations in most cases. In
addition, the parties interested in debt contracts tend to be sophisti-
cated investors, whose expectations are unlikely to outrun the text's
plain meaning.
Acceptance of the above proposition that classicism promotes
certainty completes only the first stage of the inquiry. We still must
ascertain the expected value of the certainty benefit. A few practical
observations show that this value is probably not very great.
First, classically inspired rules will not produce complete cer-
tainty. Only perfect drafting can do that, and perfect drafting is
unattainable. Thus, costly uncertainty will persist even under the
most classical of rules. Moreover, the claim that classical norms best
encourage parties to come as close as possible to perfect drafting rings
a bit hollow in the debt contract context. Large transactions with
sophisticated parties provide economic incentives toward perfect
drafting in any event. The resulting documents, while imperfect,
certainly tend to be exhaustive. In such a context, the drafter's aver-
sion to the prospect of neoclassical judicial meddling (whether by
means of inaccurate notions of the business context or good faith
moralizing) could prove a stronger incentive to clear, thorough draft-
ing than aversion to the prospect of classical judicial literalism.
107 See Friedman, Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 751, 774-77 (1965).
108 See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
109 642 F.2d at 947-48 & n.20.
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It also must be noted that classical rules do not afford certain
knowledge that courts will attach standard usage meanings in all
cases. Judges circumvented the strictures of the rules even in classi-
cism's palmy days. 110 The Broad rule builds in such circumvention by
permitting unspecified "compelling reasons" to overcome plain mean-
ing. This leaves the judge free to attach a contextual meaning in the
first hard case that comes along.
Conversely, the increment of uncertainty resulting from an unre-
stricted neoclassical approach probably would be trivial in magni-
tude. Good drafting is the reason once again. Standard form debt
contracts limit the room for neoclassical maneuvering. And, as Zeiler,
LTV and Buchman demonstrate, inquiry into all the circumstances
often only serves to reinforce the literal meaning. Of course, as Sharon
Steel shows, neoclassical moral impulses can prompt improbable read-
ings of technical provisions. But certainty in corporate debtor-creditor
relationships is not seriously undermined even by this sort of decision.
The relationships' fundamentals, such as the debtor's promise to pay,
remain immune to such interpretive vagaries. And the sort of oppor-
tunistic behavior which results in culpability becoming a determina-
tive interpretive factor has its own destabilizing effects.
The problem of inconsistent juries remains. But it only arises in
Broad because the court takes the neoclassical view that evidence of
circumstances from outside the four corners of the document trans-
forms interpretation questions into questions of fact.' The Second
Circuit's Sharon Steel opinion' 2 takes another approach. It makes all
interpretation matters questions of law unless they involve extrinsic
evidence bearing on the credibility of witnesses. Ironically, this is the
classical approach, and here, it largely solves the neoclassical consist-
ency problem. 1 3
Finally, classicism's tendency to advance the expectations of par-
ties to debt contracts has the shortcomings of a tendency. It will not
advance expectations in every case. Expectations and plain meanings
110 See E. Farnsworth, supra note 8, § 7.9, at 485 & n.8.
" 642 F.2d at 947-948 & n.20.
112 691 F.2d at 1048-51.
13 Note that the Second Circuit resorts to this single classical stricture to facilitate a broad
neoclassical inquiry while, in the Fifth Circuit, a neoclassical view of the jury function encour-
ages a classical approach to the substantive question. It remains to be seen whether, under the
Second Circuit approach, aggressive counsel with platoons of expert witnesses can make every
interpretation question a jury question.
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can become misaligned even with respect to debt contracts. As in
Broad, unforeseen financial devices can spring up outside the set of
transactions contemplated by the drafter. Or, as in Harris, the draft-
ing can contain defects unnoticed by the parties. Classicism risks
frustration of expectations in such cases. Such occasional frustration of
expectations produces its own transactional uncertainty. A more even-
handed analytical balance of linguistic integrity and context would
permit courts to protect expectations in these cases, while promoting
certainty by respecting the literal word in the broad run of cases.
Standard efficiency claims, too, may be advanced on behalf of
the classical approach, but these largely overlap the certainty claims.
The argument is as follows: The uncertainty attending neoclassical
inquiry imposes risks, and thus costs, on the contracting parties.I 4 To
the extent that classicism avoids this uncertainty cost," 5 the costs of
borrowing and lending money decline. At the margin, then, classicism
facilitates value-enhancing transactions which otherwise might be
impossible.
This theoretical argument might carry some weight if accompa-
nied by empirical evidence that neoclassicism in fact is more likely to
lead the courts to results that are contrary to the parties' expectations.
But even if that proof were :made, the net inefficiencies probably
would be minimal. Standard debt contracts can be redrafted cheaply
to avoid any judicial interpretation the marketplace dislikes.'" Only
those existing contracts subject to such an aberrant interpretation
would suffer lasting consequences. 117
To sum up, the certainty and efficiency advantages of Broad's
qualified classicism may be more theoretical than real. Contrariwise,
uninhibited neoclassicism may produce less uncertainty and less ineffi-
ciency than might appear at first glance.
B. Process Considerations
Classical interpretation very well may bring more appreciable
savings in the courthouse than in the marketplace. The narrower
"' See Sharon Steel, 691 F.2d at 1048 ("uncertainties ... vastly increase the risks and,
therefore, the costs of borrowing"); cf. R. Posner, supra note 19, at 76 ("Clearly, then, to the risk
averse risk is a cost, and its elimination a gain.").
15 Elsewhere in this Article, I have argued that such extent is likely to be zero. See supra notes
109-13 and accompanying text.
I"8 This point is developed at length in Bratton, supra note 12.
"7 Of course, the issuer and bondholders could agree to modify the contract so as to avoid the
aberrant interpretation. But this is unlikely to occur, as the party benefitted by the interpretation
is unlikely to have an economic incentive to surrender the gain.
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classical inquiry might be cheaper for the parties to litigate." 8 It
certainly would be easier on the judge. Classical analysis proceeds
along familiar lawyerlike lines. The judge takes a dictionary meaning
and checks to make sure it fits smoothly into the document's regula-
tory scheme. Neoclassical analysis, by expanding the inquiry to in-
clude all real world expectations, requires courts to make judgments
informed as much by business as by legal considerations. Such business
judgments lie outside of what many judges like to see as the ordinary
sphere of their competence. These considerations of judicial conven-
ience and judicial competence are buttressed by the substantial self-
protective capabilities of the parties to these relationships. Large bor-
rowers and institutional lenders tend to have sufficient means to
withstand minor impairments to their expectations and to protect
themselves against the recurrence of such impairments.
Of course this theme of self-protection tends as a practical matter
to mean self-protection for the lender only. The closing of the loan
satisfies most of the borrower's transactional goals. The lender's expec-
tations depend much more on contract rights and judicial enforce-
ment mechanisms. By restricting the interpretation inquiry, the courts
increase the lender's burden by making it less likely that the system of
contract provisions on which the lender depends actually will protect
it."" The courts thereby also protect the borrower's interest in plan-
ning freedom by putting the burden to inhibit it on the lender. By thus
burdening lenders and protecting borrowers, contract law does no
more than play the theme of creditor self-protection that dominates
most debtor-creditor law.
All three of these considerations-judicial convenience, judicial
business incompetence and creditor self-protection-are erratically
and selectively applied by the courts. With other business relation-
ships, courts routinely give primacy to the strain of contemporary
legal values which bids them to go as far as the relevant evidence
carries them in pursuit of the fairest result. Consider as an example
the extensive jurisprudence of fiduciary duties of management to
stockholders and of majority to minority stockholders. Judicial deci-
sions respecting these corporate relationships disregard convenience
' But it can be noted that the Broad opinion's qualified classicism, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 86-90, invites litigating parties to try out contextual arguments in case the court might
find them "compelling." Thus, some of the costs of neoclassicism are incurred in any event.
"o A different situation arises upon the debtor's insolvency. At this point, the law of fraudu-




and involve complex business judgments.1 20 The same point can be
made regarding requirements contracts and exclusive dealing con-
tracts. The good faith questions generated by these relationships rou-
tinely entail both great judicial effort and difficult judicial business
judgments.' 2 ' In both areas, also, moral strictures against selfish be-
havior figure prominently among the judicial norms' constituent ele-
ments. And yet no systematic distinctions can be drawn between the
self-protective capabilities of the parties to these relationships and
corporate creditors. The cast of characters in all these situations in-
cludes large corporate entities and similarly sophisticated individuals.
As the old doctrinal barriers to protective judicial intervention fall
away with respect to more and more business relationships, the con-
tinued presence of such barriers in corporate debtor-creditor relations
becomes increasingly anomalous.
The above discussion makes the significance of Sharon Steel's
second phase all the more apparent. Sharon Steel shows that corporate
debt relationships may be subject to aggressive modes of interpreta-
tion popularly supposed to be applicable only to other contractual
relationships. The particular mode utilized shows rare judicial solici-
tude of creditor interests by shifting the drafting burden to the bor-
rower. Should this approach become widespread, the traditional cred-
itor diligence ethic could lose its place as the primary consideration
guiding judicial participation in corporate debtor-creditor relation-
ships.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing defense of the second phase of Sharon Steel asserts
only that the Second Circuit's interpretation was permissible. The
court also could have followed probable expectations with substantial
jusification. It would not have been wrong in either event.
Only a clear contract dictates a single "correct" decision, and, by
definition, no interpretation question arises when the contract is clear.
Unclear provisions, under this analysis, always admit of more than
one interpretation and offer the court a choice.1 2 Interpretive norms,
120 See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1969); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12
Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981).
121 See, e.g., Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).
1 H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 352 (M. Knight trans. 1970).
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embodying the values implicit in much of contemporary contract law,
provide judges with reasons for choosing between the competing
meanings. Judicial governance of the relationship vindicating one or
another of such values is involved in every case. Thus, all interpreta-
tion involves judicial "intervention."
Prevailing norms can strongly suggest one meaning in preference
to another, as in the easy cases discussed above. 123 But, as in the
difficult cases, the norms also can leave the court with considerable
discretion in choosing between permissible alternatives. Considered in
this light, judicial "intervention" occurs when the judge follows norms
pointing away from the text of the contract provision at issue.
What distinguishes debt contract relationships from many other
contractual relationships is the narrow scope of judicial discretion
permitted in the usual interpretation case under prevailing norms.
The norms protect expectations, and the debt contract's exhaustive
nature and clear drafting tend strongly to indicate where expectations
lie. The parties remain the primary law-givers.
Within the narrow area of judicial discretion permitted by debt
contracts, we find cases in which expectations and language conflict,
and cases in which are presented opportunistic behavior unsanctioned
by the debt contract, the particular participants or the marketplace in
general. In such cases, courts can select among available norms and
vindicate linguistic integrity, the parties' expectations, or more subjec-
tive good faith considerations as the situation demands. Given the
wide range of possible situations and business interests, restriction to
classical norms cannot be justified.
"I Professor Owen Fiss has made a very similar observation regarding constitutional adjudica-
tion. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739, 744-45 (1982).
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